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® ¸)R.Thusx2 =0if(1¡ D0


















































































































































































































































26Table 1. Summary of Central Bank Interventions
Problem Type of Centar Bank Intervention Costs Result
Speculative gridlock Coordinating role of Central Bank
• Guarantee credit lines
• Deposit insurance
Never used in equilibrium;





Ex ante monitoring and supervision Imperfect monitoring leads to
forbearance and moral hazard
Proposition 4.1
Orderly closure of insolvent bank and
arrangement of credit lines to by-pass it
No cost, apart for moral hazard and
money center banks;
in case of money center banks it may









































































































































Xi =0orDi =Ri.ButXi cannotbezero(unlessallxj arealsozero)and
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31ProofofProposition4.2.IfR=
0
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tobeanequilibriumbecomes
D=M(¸)R=M(¸)
0
B B B
@
0
R
:::
R
1
C C C
A ¸D0: (7.8)
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